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Although there is an important debate going on in the
world over the effects of 'monetarism', only very
rarely is it emphasized that 'monetarism' is far more
comprehensive than a concern with the money supply
and inflation.
At one level is the legitimate (if exaggerated) concern
about the rate of inflation. As is well known, according
to this school of thought, the rate of inflation is
determined by excess aggregate demand; the main
mechanism which causes an expansion of aggregate
demand is growth of the money supply. This position
is best summarised by Friedman's statement that
'Inflation is at any time and in any place a monetary
phenomenon' I Friedman 19681. Friedman puts forward
the view that, in the long run, the quantity of money
has a negligible effect on real income, its effect being
mainly on nominal income. Therefore, the price level
is a joint outcome of the monetary forces determining
nominal income and the real forces determining real
income see Friedman 19701. Whatever their limitations,
the monetarists do make an important contribution in
stressing that monetary expansion is inevitably
inflationary in effect. They tend to ignore however,
any analysis of the sociological, political and economic
factors determining monetary expansion. The Latin
American 'structuralist' school, as well as the Anglo-
Saxon 'cost-push' approach (particularly in their more
simplistic versions) consistently underplay the role of
the monetary mechanism in inflation, viewing inflation
as mainly a non-monetary phenomenon; such
approaches run the danger of ignoring the inevitable
impact which deficit financing and money expansion
will have on prices.
However, hidden behind the monetarists' legitimate
concern about inflation and its causes is a radical
attempt to lay the base for a more successful and pure
model of capitalist development, with almost exclusive
reliance on free market forces. On the one hand,
monetarist policies, particularly in the Third World
and to a lesser extent in the UK, attempt to carry out
structural reforms to eliminate previous 'distortions'
in the price systems; 'correcf pricing requires
privatisation: of state enterprises, rapid reduction (or
elimination) of tariff barriers and exchange controls as
well as elimination of government subsidies for basic
foods, social services and private enterprises. On the
other hand, the long-term aim of monetarism is to
restore conditions for higher profits in the private
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sector, which are expected to lead to higher levels of
investment and growth. Measures such as reducing
direct taxation and attempting to weaken the power of
the trade unions are geared towards this ultimate
objective. One of the key paradoxes, which we will
explore further below and in the articles of this Bulletin,
is that even though direct taxation is reduced and
wage claims decline substantially, profits of the private
sector (particularly in industry) often decline in
monetarist experiments. Although the private sector
is given greater freedom to operate, and some of its
costs are reduced, the environment caused by monetarist
policies (high interest rates, an over-valued exchange
rateleading to export difficultiesand a reduced
internal market, due to restraint in public expenditure
and real wages) seems to stifle the private sector's
potential for profits and investment. Naturally, public
investment declines as a result of monetarist policies:
this is one of their targets. It should be of greater
concern to monetarists that private investment declines
as well!
In the broader sense, monetarism in the Third World
implies freeing the magic of the market forces, both
internally and internationally. This has led all Third
World monetarist governments, (as well as some others),
to pursue outward oriented development strategies.
The recently published book by Bela Balassa (The
New/v Industrialising C'ount ries in the World Economy,
Pergammon Press) enthusiastically puts forward the
merits of such a strategy. In his review of the book in
this Bulletin MacLean basically endorses this positive
appraisal of outward-oriented models. Geoff Lamb is
moré sceptical, emphasising particularly the question
of consistency between rapid economic opening up
and political democracy. Many other authors (including
those appearing in this Bulletin. eg Felix) also question
the inevitable link between open economy and better
economic performance which Balassa claims to
establish.
Pessimism about the effects of morietarist policies
may be exaggerated at the time of writing (September
1981). As the articles by David Felix and Philip O'Brien
detail, in Argentina and Chile in 1981, the economic
problems and contradictions seem to be increasing
significantly. As Filgueira discusses in his article, the
Southern Cone models also have perverse effects on
the patterns of consumption of different strata of the
population. Despondency in the UK about the effects
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of monetarist policies affects not only workers and
industrial entrepreneurs, but also the City, that alleged
fortress of conservatism. Doubts are increasing in the
United States about the effectiveness of monetarist
policies in the largest industrial country; again, the
fears are increasingly shared by workers, industrial
entrepreneurs and financiers. It is possible thatas
the monetarists' and some Marxists claimthese are
only rough patches on the road towards successful
capitalist development in the very long term. While
the truth or falsehood of this can only be provided by
future events, the results so far certainly justify current
pessimism.
This Bulletin focuses on the effects of monetarist
policies in the Third World. The cases of Chile and
Argentina are analysed in depth in articles by O'Brien,
Wells, Felix, and Beccaria and Carciofi. Besides their
intrinsic interest, their importance lies in the thoroughness
and pureness with which they pioneered the application
of radical monetarist polices. Their experiences are
therefore of interest not only to policy-makers in other
Third World countries (who are beginning to apply or
consider the application of radical monetarist policies):
they also have relevance for policy-makers in industrial
countries, even though there are important differences
between industrial countries and those of the Southern
Cone.
The effects of monetarism in the developing countries
are not limited to the application of these theories
there. As Dudley Seers points out in the Foreword, the
implementation of monetarist policies in the industrial
countries (and particularly in the United States) has a
dramatic effect on the international framework within
which developing countries have to operate, seriously
constraining their own options for growth and
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development. Developing countries are doubly hit by
monetarist policies in the industrial countries (and
particularly in the US). Contraction of economic
activity in industrial countries leads to slower growth
or decline in the export markets of the Third World,
affecting both their industrial and commodity exports.
Simultaneously, the very high interest rates of the last
two years, particularly, but not only in the US, has
dramatically increased the debt service burden of the
developing countries. In the 1970s, a rapidly increasing
proportion of external finance to the Third World
came via private banking loans, almost all negotiated
on the basis of variable interest rates (which follow the
US interest rate very closely). 1f the total variable
interest debt to private banks by developing countries
reaches $130 bn (a Morgan Guaranty estimate), then
every percentage point that the US interest rate increases
implies an annual increase of $1.3 bn for Third World
debt servicing.
Monetarist policies in industrial countries will therefore
seriously worsen the foreign exchange constraint (already
made more serious by the rises in the price of oil) that
governments of developing countries will have to face
in the near future. It is to be feared that in their need to
obtain greater external finance, governments of
developing countries will increasingly have to accept
loans from official international institutions, such as
the IMF, where recent softening of conditionality may
be reversed, mainly as a result of US government
pressure (for an analysis of IMF conditionality and the
economic theory behind it, see Philip Daniel's article
in this Bulletin).
Although monetarism, as well as neo-classical economics
have been well known in academic circles for several
decades, their radical implementation in many countries
is a relatively recent phenomenon. As Felix points out
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in his article, monetarist stabilisation efforts in the
1950s and l960s, particularly in the semi-industrialised
countries of Latin America, had foundered on working
class and populist political opposition; as a result their
implementation was always partial and usually short-
lived. Since the early 1970s, monetarism seems to have
spread as rapidly (and some would argue as destructively)
as a forest fire. Monetarist policies were first applied
in a very radical form in the Southern Cone of Latin
America in the mid-1970s. They have spread, sometimes
in milder forms, not only to neighbouring countries
(such as Peru), but also to other continents (Turkey's
conversion to monetarism after last year's coup seems
very determined). Asian countries are moving more
gradually towards monetarism; (Michell's article on
South Korea in this Bulletin details this more recent
shift). As is well known, radical monetarism has now
emerged in the industrial countries.
It seems necessary to examine, albeit briefly, the
reason for this rapid spread of monetarism amongst
policy-makers. As Wells points out in his article, in
Chile and Argentina particular circumstances made
the introduction of 'radical' monetarism easier. It is
certainly no accident that these two countries (which
reverted to such 'ultra-orthodox' monetarist policies)
experienced at the time annual rates of inflation of
over 400 per cent, while their foreign exchange situation
was extremely precarious. In both countries, previous
governments (socialist in Chile and populist in Argentina)
had shown little inclination or ability to contain pressures
for expanding expenditure and consumption. Serious
financial disequilibria (accompanied by the fear of
socialism in certain sectors) considerably strengthened
the position ot those committed to strict economic
orthodoxy and 'free-market' economics see Griffith-
Jones 19811. Furthermore, particularly in the Chilean
experience, the social groups which had traditionally
opposed monetarism were repressed. As trade unions
were suspended and political parties banned, the
traditional political constraints to implement orthodox
policies were eliminated. As the Chilean Minister of
Finance, Sergio de Castro, pointed out in 1978, this
'allowed the economic management team absolute
independence in pursuing precisely the policies they
wanted'. Finally, in Chile and Argentina, as elsewhere
in the Third World, the preferçnce which international
financial institutions (and particularly the IMF) and
some governments have for monetarist' policies provided
international backing for the supporters of ultra-
orthodoxy.
The reasons for the spread of monetarism in the
advanced industrial countries is an important subject,
which somewhat escapes the scope of this Bulletin.
However, as pointed out at the beginning of this
Editorial, it seems clear that its main target is to lay the
base for a more successful and purer model of capitalist
development; this would require an increase in profits
and investment. The reason for the systematic decline
in post-tax profits in the last decade are clearly
summarised in Rowthorne:
for more than a decade the share of post-tax profits
in output has declined through the advanced capitalist
world. The immediate causes of this decline are as
follows: rising state expenditure, often under the
impact of popular pressure for better social services
and benefits; worsening terms of trade with primary
producers during 1972-74, in part because of a
shortage of primary commodities and in part because
of the organised power of the OPEC cartel; and
finally, the existence of a strong working class
movement demanding higher real wages and unwilling
to restrain its consumption and free resources for
use by the state and transfer to primary producers.
Given the competing claims of workers, the state
and primary producers, the amount left for profits
was greatly reduced.
)Rowthorne 1976:110, my emphasisi
The paradox of monetarism in industrial countries is
that it seems relatively successful in weakening the
working class movement (via recession and increased
unemployment), which has implied smaller wage claims;
it also seems to have been relatively successful recently
in weakening the power of primary producers,
particularly OPEC, via the recession. It seems, however,
much less successful in its ultimate target of increasing
profits and private investment.
Thus many of the dilemmas encountered by monetarists
in the Third World may repeat themselves in tbe
industrial countries. The social cost of monetarism in
the industrial countries will be attenuated by the
existence of social security and unemployment benefits
(which, however, make the economic success of
monetarism more difficult); the social costs will also
be moderated by political opposition to monetarism,
which, fortunately, can probably not be repressed.
However, the costs to the Third World of monetarism
in the industrial countries will undoubtedly be very
high in terms of factors such as shrinking export
markets, more expensive foreign credit and debt. The
indirect impact of monetarism in industrial countries
may yet prove more costly for the Third World than
the limited, national experiments in monetarism
conducted by Third World Chicago Boys.
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